Reason in Tradition/History

What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to and what we now need to recover is, so I shall argue, a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception according to which the standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the history of that same tradition. (7)

Alasdair MacIntyre | Whose Justice? Which Rationality?


Secularism & Class Conflict

The key difference between the seventeenth- and the eighteenth-century examples is the consciousness of the emerging autonomy of secular life.  This autonomy is strengthened by the tendency apparent in secular life for economic growth to result in the splitting of society into new kinds of class division.  The relations between classes become in crucial ways relations of conflict.  It is of course true that throughout the course of these conflicts there are attempts to continue the appeal to common norms and to revive the older social and moral values, but the changing structure of society makes it only too obvious to all parties that the alleged authoritative norms to which appeal is made are in fact man-made, and that they are not the norms of the whole community to which in their own way men of every rank are equally subject.  In so far as the norms which do govern the new standard economic, political, and social relations between classes are given a religious significance, what happens is that religion is invoked to justify the norms which one class wishes and is able to use against another.  (13-14)

Alasdair MacIntyre | Secularization and Moral Change

Religion & Urbanization

In both the United States and Britain there has been, and there still is, a significant relationship between the size of a given city and the church membership and attendance in that city.  In general the larger the population of a city the smaller the proportion of church members in that population.  Why?  An answer that at first sight must appear only to take us round in a circle is that the larger the city the higher tends to be the proportion of working-class population; but what I in fact want to suggest is that the distinctive forms of urban working-class life in the industrial city, as they came into being, and as they are to be contrasted with, for example, working-class life in the domestic industries of the eighteenth century or in the earlier and smaller commercial city, marked a distinct change so far as religion is concerned.  What the urbanization of the Industrial Revolution meant was the destruction of the older forms of community, in many cases rapidly, and in particular the destruction of those features of them to which religion had given symbolic expression.  There is first of all the loss of the background of a given and largely unalterable natural order within whose limits men of different social rank all have to live.  There is secondly the disappearance of the relative continuity and stability of social order, a stability which makes that order appear continuous with the order of nature.  There is thirdly an end to the existence of shared and established norms, common to all ranks in the community, in the light of which everyone stands either vindicated or convicted by their own conduct.  Religion, when it is the religion of a whole society, may have functions other than the expression of the natural and social order, but it is always ate least an expression of a society’s moral unity, and it lends to that unity a cosmic and universal significance and justification. (11-12)

Alasdair MacIntyre | Secularization and Moral Change

When Religion Really is the Opium of the People

It must be granted that the Marxist critique holds true for a great deal of religion, and in particular for a great deal of nineteenth-century religion.  The doctrine of the Tractarians, for example, helps to illustrate the critique.  Suspiciously enough, the doctrines of priesthood and of apostolic succession were rediscovered by Anglicans just at the time when the state was beginning to deny in its practice any real difference between nonconformity and the Church of England.  High churchmanship replaced social eminence as the mark of the staunch Anglican.  The ascetic disciplines which the Tractarians commended were of a kind possible only to a leisured class; their sacramental doctrines were irrelevant in an industrial society.  F.D. Maurice wrote of their view of baptism in 1838: “Where is the minister of Christ in London, Birmingham or Manchester, whom such a doctrine, heartily and inwardly entertained, would not drive to madness?  He is sent to preach the Gospel.  What Gospel?  Of all the thousands whom he addresses, he cannot venture to believe that there are ten who, in Dr. Pusey’s sense, retain their baptismal purity.  All he can do, therefore, is to tell wretched creatures, who spend eighteen hours of the twenty-four in close factories and bitter toil, corrupting and being corrupted, that if they spend the remaining six in prayer — he need not add fasting — they may possibly be saved.  How can we insult God and torment man with such mockery?”  There was another side to the doctrine of the Tractarians; but of a great deal of what they and churchmen of every persuasion taught the Marxist critique was and remains true. (108-109)

Alasdair MacIntyre | Marxism and Christianity

What Liberalism Rejects

There have long been ample grounds for the rejection of this or that part of Marxism; what is interesting, however, is the way in which the rejection of Marxism normally entails the rejection of the possibility of constructing any view of the world which possesses the dimensions of Marxism.  Not only are the moral attitudes of Marx, or the analysis of past history, or the predictions about the future abandoned; so is the possibility of any doctrine which connects moral attitudes, beliefs about the past, and beliefs in future possibility.  The lynch pin of this rejection is the liberal belief that facts are one thing, values another — and that the two realms are logically independent of each other.  This belief underpins the liberal rejection of Christianity as well as the liberal rejection of Marxism.  For the liberal, the individual being the source of all value necessarily legislates for himself in matters of value; his autonomy is only preserved if he is regarded as choosing his own ultimate principles, unconstrained by any external consideration.  But for both Marxism and Christianity only the answer to questions about the character of nature and society can provide the basis for an answer to the question: “But how ought I to live?”  For the nature of the world is such that in discovering the order of things I also discover my own nature and those ends which beings such as myself must pursue if we are not to be frustrated in certain predictable ways.  Knowledge of nature and society is thus the principal determinant of action. (123-124)

Alasdair MacIntyre | Marxism and Christianity